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Article 8

Essay
FAITH IN LEGAL PROFESSIONALISM:
BELIEVERS AND HERETICS
SAMUEL J. LEVINE*
INTRODUCTION

In 1995, Professor Fred Zacharias observed that "[o]ver the past
two decades, hundreds of articles and speeches have focused on the
meaning of professionalism, its perceived 'decline,' and steps the bar
"1
should take to improve it.
Since then, the concern expressed by
commentators over the vitality of professionalism within the legal
2
community has only increased.
Professor Eugene Gaetke, observing the distress concerning professionalism within the legal community, pointed out that the "distinct
yearning, by those within and without the bar, for lawyers to display
more 'professionalism,"' has precipitated a "crisis of professionalism
at the dawning of the new century."3 The erosion of professionalism
* Research Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. B.A., Ordination,
Yeshiva University; J.D., Fordham University; LL.M., Columbia University.
I thank Russ Pearce, Tom Shaffer, and Jerry Wetlaufer for helpful discussions and
Fraida Liba, Yehudah Tzvi, and Aryeh Shalom for their encouragement.
1. Fred C. Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalismand Client Interests, 36 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 1303, 1307 n.11 (1995).
2. As Professor Therese Maynard recently noted, "[t]he literature teems with articles
that describe, often in rather distressing terms, the crisis within the legal profession today."
Therese Maynard, Teaching Professionalism:The Lawyer as a Professiona4 34 GA.L. REv. 895,
895 n.2 (2000).
3. Eugene R. Gaetke, Foreword: Renewed Introspection and the Legal Profession, 87 Ky. L.J.
903, 909-10 (1998-99) (footnotes omitted). A number of commentators have examined
the causes and implications of the modern professionalism crisis. See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON,

A

NATION UNDER LAWYERS:

How THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION Is TRANSFORM-

SOCIETY (1994) (examining fundamental changes in the nature of the legal
profession, and the effect those changes are having on American society); Susan Daicoff,
Lawyer, Know Thyself"A Review of EmpiricalResearch on Attorney Attributes Bearingon Professionalism, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 1337, 1347 n.33 (1997) (using empirical research to argue that
lawyers have personality characteristics that are the source of the professionalism problem); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE LJ. 1239, 1277-80 (1991)
(describing the legal profession's "crisis" as a loss of legitimacy caused by economic and
political change); David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in
Dark Times, 9 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHICS 31 (1995) (offering a method of teaching legal ethics
during the crisis of professionalism). See generally ProfessionalismSymposium, 52 S.C. L. REv.
443 (2001) (discussing the need for improvements to the professionalism of the legal community and exploring various solutions to the professionalism problem).
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has been attributed to the cynical image of the lawyer propounded by
the media, the relative absence of "positive image-building of the lawyer,"4 and the failure of practitioners and professors to "shap[e] ...
law students and new lawyers into ethical practitioners."5
However, the prevailing trend within the legal community has
been to associate the decline of professionalism in the practice of law
with the emergence of increasing commercialism, indicating that law
has become more a business than a profession. 6 The practice of law
has been "transformed ...

from an honorable calling to an ordinary

business" by "lawyers [themselves], clients, and market conditions."7
This shift from "professionalism" to "commercialism" has occurred "as
practitioners increasingly focus upon profit, surrender professional independence and employ unprincipled tactics to achieve clients'
ends."'
4. Jeffrey W. Stempel, EmbracingDescent: The Bankruptcy of a Business Paradigmfor Conceptualizingand Regulating the Legal Profession, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 25, 29 (1999). Professor
Stempel criticizes depictions of lawyers in popular culture in the following manner:
Instead of Perry Mason, we have Ally McBeal, L.A. Law, and The Practice. McBeal
is embarrassingly airheaded, and more focused on finding a good nightclub than
practicing good law. The gang in L.A. Law struck a number of blows for conspicuous consumption and moral decline but relatively few for justice. The Practice
does somewhat better, but needs its share of material goods and torrid embraces
as well. If popular culture is any indication, lawyer professionalism is not merely
going through a low point-it has reached Death Valley.
Id. at 29-30.
5. PatrickJ. Schiltz, Legal Ethics in Decline: The Elite Law Firm, the Elite Law School, and the
Moral Formation of the Novice Attorney, 82 MINN. L. REV. 705, 707 (1998).
6. See Marvin E. Aspen, The Searchfor Renewed Civility in Litigation, 28 VAL. U. L. REV.
513, 516-17 (1994) (stating that "[m]any lawyers believe [the practice of law] is now as
much a business as a calling or a profession"); Anthony T. Kronman, Professionalism, 2 J.
INST. FOR STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 89, 90 (1999) (observing that "a new and aggressive culture
of commercial values, which claims for itself a moral as well as a material superiority, is
spreading through the profession as a whole"); Luban & Millemann, supra note 3, at 32
(describing the "widespread perception [of] ... a more diffuse erosion of values-from
'professionalism' to 'commercialism'"); see also Rayman L. Solomon, Five Crises or One: The
Concept of Legal Professionalism, 1925-1960, in LAwYERs' IDEALS/LAwyERS' PRACTICEs: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 145, 173 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds.,
1992) (attributing the "loss of confidence in the legitimacy of the profession" to the "perceived lack of separation between law and business"); cf. Warren E. Burger, The Decline of
Professionalism, 63 FoRDHm L. REv. 949, 949 (1995) (noting that "[t]he law is not and
never has been a 'business[,]' [b]ut we are well on the way to making it less than a profession"). See generally Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism ParadigmShift: Why DiscardingProfessional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229
(1995) (describing the transformation of law practice from a profession to a business and
predicting an emerging business paradigm).
7. Eleanor W. Myers, "Simple Truths"About MoralEducation, 45 AM. U. L. REv. 823, 827
(1996).
8. Wm. Reece Smith,Jr., Teachingand LearningProfessionalism,32 WAKE FOREST L. REv.
613, 613 (1997).
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Many scholars argue that the movement towards law-as-business
instead of law-as-profession has introduced the values of the marketdriven economy into the practice of law, thus replacing its "moral traditions."9 Some prominent scholars who have noted this shift actually
embrace the business model, claiming that adopting the business
model will "promot[e] a shared commitment to the common good."1"
Despite the evidence apparently supporting the position that law
has evolved into a business, others have responded by reaffirming the
professionalism model, arguing that legal practice remains true to its
professional ideals." Dean Anthony Kronman, one of the most prominent defenders of the professionalism model, recently stated his belief that "the ethical, spiritual, and moral traditions of our profession
have a durability that will allow us... to look back to these traditional
ideals and to find guidance and support and strength in them as we

9. Transcript, The Second DrikerForum for Excellence in the Law, 42 WAYNE L. REv. 115,
118-19 (1995) (remarks of Anthony T. Kronman) [hereinafter The Second Driker Forum].
10. Pearce, supra note 6, at 1276; Ward Bower, Law Firm Economics and Professionalism,
100 DICK. L. REv. 515, 516 (1996). For example, Professor Bower points out that "[t]he
economic pressures in the law firm today are real and the focus on profitability necessary.
... [T]hese challenges need not cause a lawyer or a firm to compromise detachment,
professionalism, ethical practices, or competent lawyering [because] [e]ffective management and good business practices are not inconsistent with traditional 'professional' lawyering." Id.;
see also John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, Multidisciplinary Practice and the
American Legal Profession: A Market Approach to Regulating the Delivery of Legal Services in the
Twenty-First Century, 69 FoRDmim L. REv. 83, 143 (2000) (stating that "it is not clear why
lawyers desiring to maximize their profits ...is a bad thing for their clients or for society in
general").
Other scholars believe that viewing the practice of law as both a business and a profession opens new doors to the legal community and strengthens the profession. As Professor
Michael J. Kelly states:
Law is, and always has been, a business as well as a profession .... The refusal...
to keep both of these dimensions of law practice in view, is the special myopia of
the efforts of the organized bar to lead a revival of "professionalism." Once one
escapes from the clutches of thinking of "profession" and "business" as dichotomies, and comes to terms with the fact that, whether we like it not, they are joined
at the hip in private practice, a refreshing set of possibilities reveals itself.
Michael J. Kelly, Thinking About the Business of PracticingLaw, 52 VAND. L. REv. 985, 992-93
(1999) (footnotes omitted); see also Milton C. Regan, Law Firms, Competition Penalties, and
the Values of Professionalism, 13 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 33 (1999) (stating that "[o]ne problem with treating law as profession as the opposite of law as business ... is that it ignores
how the material conditions of practice have shaped the opportunities of lawyers to pursue
non-commercial values"); Joseph P. Tomain, A Code of One's Own, 15 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'V 153, 169 (2001) (positing that "[i]f lawyers and law firms think in a
more business-like way, then they will act more professionally .... [T]hey will increase
value to clients and will increase the service and loyalty to staff and to young lawyers").
11. See, e.g., Anthony T. Kronman, Foreword: Chapman University School of Law Groundbreaking Ceremony Friday, 1 CH-lAP. L. REv. 1 (1998); Milton V. Freeman, The Professionof Law
is NOT on the Decline, 96 DICK. L. REv. 149 (1992); Maynard, supra note 2.
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try to work our way" out of the current professionalism crisis.' 2 In
fact, some scholars, while noting the crisis within the legal community,
still express the pride they feel towards the profession they chose. As
Professor Maynard has explained:
I am proud to call myself a member of the legal profession.
Yes, even in these times, I walk tall, hold my head high, and
proudly announce to my students that I am a licensed member of the California Bar... because
I believe lawyering con13
tinues to be a noble profession.
These scholars admit that the professional paradigm is not without its
flaws, but argue that it is more4 likely to lead to a better practice of law
1
than the business paradigm.
This Essay suggests that the abiding faith many scholars have expressed in the professionalism model more closely parallels a declaration of religious belief than an empirical or analytical conclusion
developed through systematic reasoning or observation. 1" This critique is certainly not intended as an endorsement of what one scholar
has called a "dogma[ ] of liberalism" that "religious beliefs are irrational or non-rational and therefore cannot meet the standards of
public
reason.""
consistent
with the to
ideas
I have
expressed
v I drawRather,
elsewhere,
a parallel
here specifically
those
religious
argu-

12. The Second Driker Forum, supra note 9, at 118-19.
13. Maynard, supra note 2, at 895-96 (footnotes omitted).
14. See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 4. Some legal scholars who believe that the professionalism paradigm is the best hope for the legal profession do not believe that the legal profession can be saved. For example, Professor Robert F. Cochran, Jr., stated:
There is a new emphasis on professionalism within legal education and the
organized bar. The leaders of the profession call on lawyers to go beyond the
incentives of the market. . . [where] the moral basis for this call to service is our
status as professionals.
Though I wish the new professionalism well, I am not hopeful.... I fear that
the foundations for professionalism are gone.
Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Professionalism in the Postmodern Age: Its Death, Attempts at Resuscitation, and Alternate Sources of Virtue, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHicS & PuB. PoL'v 305, 305-06
(2000).
15. See Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter's Commentary on the Professionalism Crusade, 74 TEx. L.
REv. 259 (1995) (describing and critiquing the religious nature of the professionalism
movement).
16. Ronald F. Thiemann, Religion and Legal Discourse: An Indirect Relation, 81 MARQ. L.
REv. 289, 296 (1998).
17. See, e.g., SamuelJ. Levine, CapitalPunishment and Religious Arguments: An Intermediate
Approach, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTs.J. 179 (2000) (arguing for the use of religious arguments
as a comparative law model during the examination of complex legal issues); Samuel J.
Levine, Law, Ethics, and Religion in the Public Square: Principles of Restraint and Withdrawal,83
MARQ. L. REv. 773 (2000) (examining the reasons why a religious adherent would want to
avoid reliance on religious doctrine in issues of public debate).
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ments that, because they are accessible only to believers, are unlikely
to be persuasive to others.'"
Specifically, this Essay engages in an examination of the views of
Dean Kronman, whose position is instructive both because of his status in the legal community and because his views appear to have
evolved over the course of more than a decade. Part I broadly traces
Kronman's loss of faith in the legal profession in the early 1990s, followed by his more recent reaffirmation of the professionalism model.
Part II offers a closer look at the evolution of Kronman's views, noting
his current use of both religious imagery and a seemingly religious
methodology to support his belief in professionalism. Part III carries
the analysis one step further, examining the methods of response
used by Kronman and other believers to attack the heretical views of
those who favor alternative models of legal practice, such as a business
model. This Essay concludes that the approach of the believers, perhaps useful in preaching to the converted, is unlikely to be an effective means of convincing nonbelievers that such faith in legal
professionalism is justified.
I.

KRONMAN AND PROFESSIONALISM: FAITH LOST AND REGAINED

Among the adherents to the professionalism model, t" Dean
Anthony Kronman may be its most notable proponent. In addition to
18. Cf KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS 102 (1995)

(ac-

knowledging that, although " [ s] ome claims about religion are based on standards of truth
that are similar to standards of truth for some nonreligious moral and political claims...
some claims of truth are self-consciously less subject to interpersonal evaluation than are
others").
19. Rather than insisting on the adoption of a specific definition, this Essay relies on a
more general understanding of the notion of "professionalism" in legal practice, particularly as implied by the contrast between a "professionalism model" and a "business model."
As many commentators have noted, there is no uniform definition of "professionalism." See, e.g., Atkinson, supra note 15, at 270-80 (elaborating on his observation that "[t]he
meaning of 'professionalism' in the current crusade is woefully-one is tempted to say
'unprofessionally'-confusing").
Other legal scholars find that a unified standard or definition would not serve the
legal community well due to the wide and varied occupational subsets within the profession. See, e.g.,
Deborah L. Rhode, The Professionalism Problem, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 283,
317 (1998). As Professor Rhode states:
[T]his is in an era of postmodern professionalism, with identities fractured along
lines of personal background, substantive specialty, and practice setting. As applied to law, the term "profession" has become a kind of folk concept. In common usage, it conveys a unity that is out of step with social realities.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Nevertheless, a number of scholars have identified certain qualities of "professionalism" in an attempt to arrive at a working definition. For example, in an attempt to define
professionalism, one scholar found that: "Professionalism... transcends the limited sense
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his status as dean of one of the most prestigious and influential law
schools in the world, Kronman's espousal of professionalism is particularly significant in light of his past pronouncements bemoaning the
current and future state of the legal profession. Specifically,
Kronman's 1993 book, The Lost Lawryer,2 ° has been acknowledged by
countless scholars as part of a trilogy of works2 by "the best and the
brightest of the legal world . . .chronicl[ing] the decline of profes-

sionalism."2 According to one scholar, amidst these three books and
those with a similar theme, Kronman's stands out as the "most thorough and perhaps most well-known
account of the decline in profes23
sionalism among today's lawyers."
of competence to include the more aspirational qualities traditionally associated with the
ideals of the legal profession: broad vision and wisdom; integrity and deep commitment to
values; compassionate regard for humanity; unselfishness and the genuine desire to serve
others; self-confidence; individualism; and leadership." Lawrence S. Krieger, What We're
Not Telling Law Students-and Lawyers-That They Really Need to Know: Some Thoughts-in-Action Toward Revitalizing the Professionfrom Its Roots, 13J.L. & HEALTH 1, 16 (1998-99); see also
Richard A. Matasar, The Two Professionalismsof Legal Education, 15 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL'Y 99, 115 n.3 (2001) (describing the author's "own professionalism mantrathe three C's of professionalism," consisting of competency, community involvement, and
commitment "to those closest to us"); Pearce, supra note 6, at 1238 & n.39 (stating that
"[c]ommentators do not agree on a single definition of professionalism" but identifying
"esoteric knowledge, altruism, and autonomy" as "three conditions, perhaps under different labels and with different emphasis, [that] are common to most constructions of professionalism" (citations omitted)); Regan, supra note 10, at 33-43 (analyzing "values
traditionally invoked in the name of professionalism," such as devotion to the client, commitment to quality, autonomy, and independence).
At least one legal scholar finds that "[t]he conditions for a profession are easy to state
and include: (1) learned knowledge; (2) skill in applying laws to facts; (3) thorough preparation; (4) practical and prudential wisdom; (5) ethical conduct and integrity; (6) dedication to justice and the public good." Tomain, supra note 10, at 156. Professor Zacharias
takes a more vague approach, noting that "from the vast literature on the subject of professionalism, one can identify several core normative themes concerning the term's meaning." Zacharias, supranote 1, at 1307. According to Professor Zacharias, "[v]irtually all of
the themes encompass the notion that the lawyer's function includes a measure of objectivity in the implementation of legal skills, goals, or practices." Id.; see also Colin Croft, Note,
ReconceptualizingAmerican Legal Professionalism:A ProposalforDeliberativeMoral Community, 67
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1256, 1263-71 (1992) (discussing the ideological and institutional attributes
of professions generally).
20. ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER (1993).
21. These works include GLENDON, supra note 3; KRONMAN, supra note 20; SOL M. LiNOWITZ & MARTIN MAYER, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION: LAWYERING AT THE END OF THE TWEN-

(1994).
22. Pearce, supra note 6, at 1230; see also Robert W. Gordon, The Radical Conservatism of
the Practice ofJustice, 51 STAN. L. REV.919, 930-31 (1999) (referring to these works as "the
best known among many jeremiads" lamenting the decline of professionalism).
23. Maynard, supra note 2, at 895 n.2; see also Thomas S. Ulen, The Prudenceof Law and
Economics: Why More Economics is Better, 26 CUMB. L. REv. 773, 773 (1996) ("Dean Anthony
Kronman is the most eloquent, thoughtful, and persuasive of the many recent critics of the
legal profession.").
TIETH CENTURY
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One of the most salient characteristics of Kronman's book, re4
peatedly emphasized by reviewers, is its pessimistic outlook. 2 For example, Professor David Wilkins refers to the book as a "deeply
pessimistic meditation on the state of the American legal profession," 25 and finds that "in Kronman's view, the current generation of
academics, practitioners, and judges has so devalued and undermined
th[e] professional ideal that its resurrection is now virtually
impossible. 2 6
Kronman's pessimism is based in large part on his observation
[T] he only
that "[t]he law has become a business like any other ....
choice that lawyers now have is whether to struggle futilely against
their fate or accept it with a measure of dignity and grace. '"27 Indeed,
Kronman put it more bluntly in his remarks at a 1994 Wayne State
University Law School forum 28 dedicated to a discussion of his book:
24. See Michael Livingston, Confessions of an Economist Killer: A Reply to Kronman's "Lost
Lawyer,"89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1592, 1618, 1620 (1995) (book review) (finding that "the greatest flaw in The Lost Lawrye9' may be Kronman's "pessimism[, which] may yet prove to be
unjustified"); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Lost Lauyer: FailingIdeals of the Legal Profession,41 Lov.
L. REV. 387, 398 (1995) (book review) (stating that "Kronman's assessment of our situation
... lacks hope"); Barry Sullivan, Professions of Law, 9 GEo.J. LEGAL ETHICS 1235, 1286, 1287
(1996) (finding that "Kronman's conclusions are gloomy" and describing Kronman's prognosis as "bleak").
The following passage from The Lost Lawyer exemplifies the type of pessimism referred
to by reviewers:
[T] he likelihood that the profession as a whole will awaken to the emptiness
of its condition and that there will be a great resurgence of support, at an institutional level, for the vanishing ideal of the lawyer-statesman seems to me quite low.
For the most part, I suspect, things will go on much as before, and the profession will drift more and more in the direction it has been moving this past quarter-century. Of course, each generation of lawyers makes its own contribution to
the architecture of the law. The contribution mine has made has been to tear
down the old system of ideas and institutions that gave the lawyer-statesman ideal
its authority and power. The next, perhaps, will begin the work of rebuilding that
we have torn apart. That may happen, and I hope it does, though I doubt in fact
it will.
KRONMAN, supra note 20, at 380-81.

25. David B. Wilkins, PracticalWisdom for PracticingLawyers: SeparatingIdeals From Ideology
in Legal Ethics, 108 HARv. L. REV. 458, 458 (1994) (reviewing KRONMAN, supra note 20); see
also Laurel Terry, Taking Kronman and Glendon One Step Further:In Celebrationof "Professional
Schools," 100 DIcK. L. REv. 647, 661 (1996) (exclaiming that "Kronman is downright pessimistic about the state of the legal profession").
26. Wilkins, supra note 25, at 458-59. However, one commentator suggests that
"[m] uch of the pessimism of contemporary law professors (and students) may actually be a
sort of repressed 1960s-era idealism, as if the pessimists have despaired of realizing their
dreams and are embarrassed to admit they still have them," and that "Kronman, in this
view, deserves credit that he still dares to dream." Livingston, supra note 24, at 1621 n.81.
27. KRONMAN, supra note 20, at 370.

28. The Second DrikerForum, supra note 9.
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America's large firms have become explicitly, candidly, without shame in the last twenty years unembarrassedly commercialistic in their outlook and practice. The bottom line has
become the only line for them, and the older ethos of craftsmanship which was nourished and reinforced in a very deliberate and careful way by lawyers in these firms a half century
ago has disappeared, and has been replaced by an ethos of
moneymaking which puts the exclusive stress mark on the
number of billable hours that you put in and the number of
dollars those billable hours produce.
Well, once you have a culture like that, of course ...
there's little left in the mythology of the firm to underscore,
to emphasize, to reinforce the value of craft as opposed to
the extrinsic importance of moneymaking.2"
After decrying the loss of "our collective professional ideals,"
Kronman asked rhetorically, "What's to replace it?" 30 His response

was consistent with the pessimism present in his book:
There are no compelling candidates on the horizon, so what
we're left with is a void in our own self-understanding, in our
professional identity. Once we had a secure self-conception
and I think an attractive and indeed I would even say noble
self-conception, but that has been shattered, and nothing
has yet emerged to replace it in a satisfying way. It is that
sense of having lost our traditional moorings and not having
the confidence that there is a successor ideal or mythology in
view.31
In the course of a few short years, however, Kronman seems to
have emerged with a new sense of optimism in the professionalism
model. In a number of recent addresses, Kronman appears to have
overcome the sense of despair that permeated his earlier book, allowing him to embrace the future of the legal profession. 2 Thus, although he still acknowledges that "the roots of legal professionalism
29. Id. at 121-22.
30. Id. at 125.
31. Id at 125-26.
32. These addresses include presentations at: Chapman University School of Law
Groundbreaking Ceremony, November 21, 1997, published as Kronman, supra note 11;
Conference on Legal Ethics: Access to Justice, held at Hofstra University School of Law,
March 10-12, 1996, published as Kronman, supra note 6, and as Kronman, TheFault in Legal
Ethics, 100 DICK. L. Rv. 489 (1996) [hereinafter Kronman, The Fault in Legal Ethics]; and
the Keynote address at Florida State University College of Law Symposium, Defining and
Refining Professionalism: Assessing the Roles and Regulation of Lawyers in the TwentyFirst Century, February 12, 1999, published as Kronman, Legal Professionalism, 27 FLA. ST.
U. L. REv. 1 (1999) [hereinafter Kronman, Legal Professionalism].

FAITH IN LEGAL PROFESSIONALISM

2002]

225

are challenged as never before[,]" 3 3 he calls for the "survival of the
profession" 4 through "the clearest possible reaffirmation of the ...
features that5 make it such, and a heroic commitment to their
3

protection."

It is striking that Kronman, until recently one of the leading witnesses to the apparently irreversible demise of professionalism, now
speaks of the ability and obligation of law schools and lawyers to reaffirm and protect the professional character of lawyering. 6 In the face
of mounting evidence and commentary suggesting that the pessimism
he expressed in The Lost Lawyer has been borne out in the years since
he issued his negative prognosis,3 7 Kronman now refuses to admit to
the defeat of the profession. His willingness, instead, to embark upon
an attempt to revive professionalism, evinces what may amount to adherence to a distinctive faith in the professionalism model that requires its followers to proclaim its vitality despite strong indications to
the contrary.

38

Professor Atkinson has similarly described a "professionalism crusade" characterized by "an implicit assumption of one true professional faith and its tendency to condemn categorically certain modes
33. Kronman, supra note 11, at 12.
34. Id.
35. Id
36. At the outset of his review of The Lost Lawyer, Professor Wilkins notes that, in the
introduction to the book, Kronman traces the origins of his thinking that ultimately
culminated in the book to a speech he delivered in 1981 at Yale Law School regarding the
legal profession and the challenging reaction he received from two of his colleagues. Wilkins, supra note 25, at 458 (citing KRONMAN, supra note 20, at vii). Professor Wilkins then
proceeds with an analysis comparing Kronman's views from 1981 with the conclusions he
reached in 1993 in The Lost Lawyer. See id. at 459 (finding that "Kronman's prognosis for
those entering the profession today remains the same as it was in 1981; they cannot expect
to find moral fulfillment in their work as lawyers").
In a similar vein, this Essay is intended, in part, as an attempt to update and continue
Professor Wilkins's project along the next segment of Kronman's career, using The Lost
Lawyer as a starting point. Unlike Professor Wilkins's earlier study, however, this Essay
finds a fundamental change in Kronman's thinking, from the pessimism found in The Lost
Lawyer to the more optimistic support of professionalism that Kronman currently
proclaims.
37. See Pearce, supra note 6, passim; Schiltz, supra note 5, at 729-30 (noting that "[in] any
commentators have lamented the increasing commercialization of the legal profession, but
few have captured the extent of this affliction .. .because it almost defies description"
(footnote omitted)); Tomain, supra note 10, at 168 (observing that "[t]he slogan that 'law
has become more of a business and less of a profession' is not without some basis in fact");
Transcript, Defining and Refining Professionalism:Assessing the Roles and Regulations of Lawyers
in the Twenty-First Century, 27 FiA. ST. U. L. REv. 205, 210 (1999) (remarks of Hon. Harry
Lee Anstead) (stating "the business paradigm has already come in and been in place in a
lot of the legal profession with the larger firms").
38. See supra note 37 (citing sources discussing the commercialization of the legal
profession).
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of conduct as cardinal sins." 9 Professor Atkinson notes that the professionalism movement is rife with religious metaphors. "Its formal
proposals tend to call for a return to a common professional faiththe supposedly shared beliefs and commitments that are enshrined in
documents described as 'Creeds,' 'Oaths,' and 'Pledges' of professionalism."4 ° Although these documents may be termed "codes," "they
read more like the Decalogue than the Uniform Commercial Code or,
41
for that matter, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility.
These titles imply, "with perhaps a more profound accuracy than their
authors intended, that the documents they describe are articles of
42
faith.
Indeed, the language that Kronman uses in his speeches advocating professionalism is more akin to the language of the religious believer than that of the academic legal scholar. In his address at the
1997 groundbreaking ceremony of Chapman University School of
Law, Kronman repeatedly uses religious imagery to describe the law
and legal education. Kronman announces that those participating in
the groundbreaking serve to "solemnize as witnesses" 4 the law
school's act of becoming "heir to the traditions of the legal profession. ' ' 4' Kronman then cites the Roman tradition to "consecrate" the
site of a building and "solemnize the occasion," in the belief that such
an action, undertaken by the "priests," followed "the paths of the
gods." 45 According to Kronman, these dedications linked the past
with the future, shaping the "history and morality and religion of the
46
Roman republic.
Of course, Kronman is far from the first American legal scholar
to cast the law in religious terms or to draw a parallel between the
American legal system and religion. Professors Robert Cover,4 7
Thomas Grey, 48 and Ronald Garet,49 along with numerous others who

39. Atkinson, supra note 15, at 263.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
Kronman, supra note 11, at 1.
Id.
Id.at 2.

46. Id.
47. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative,97
HARv.L. REV. 4 (1983).
48. Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1984).
49. Ronald R. Garet, Comparative Normative Hermeneutics: Scripture, Literature, Constitution, 58 S. CAL.L. REv. 35 (1985).
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followed in their path," ° have documented and demonstrated similarities in the interpretive methodologies employed in biblical hermeneutics and constitutional interpretation. As other scholars such as
Professors Sanford Levinson 5" and Steven Smith5 2 have demonstrated,
these similarities form but a piece of a broader notion of American
53
faith or belief in the law.
Kronman, however, appears to have taken a significant step forward in his comparison of law to religion. For Kronman, it is not
enough to recognize that, on an intellectual level, parallels exist between the disciplines of law and religion, or even that, on a more practical level, law in the United States enjoys an acceptance and
adherence in much the same way as does religion for its believers.
According to Kronman, legal practice and its professional nature comprise a belief system and a way of life for the lawyer, analogous to that
54
of religious commitment.

II.

THE EVOLUTION OF KRONMAN'S FAITH:

A

CLOSER LOOK

The genesis of this concept in Kronman's thinking can be traced
back at least to 1987, when, in an article with the telling title, Living in
the Law,55 Kronman explained that he was not interested merely in the
question of "the moral justifiability of what lawyers do."5 6 Rather,
Kronman set out to answer the more fundamental question of "[w] hat
is it about the life of a lawyer that justifies the very large commitment
which the decision to pursue it entails?"5 7 As Kronman put it,
"though my immediate concern is with lawyers and the lives they lead,
it is my hope that what I say will contribute to the current revival of
interest in the question of what it means, more generally, to live the
life of a person."5 " Thus, as early as 1987, Kronman equated an indi50. E.g., Samuel J. Levine, Unenumerated ConstitutionalRights and Unenumerated Biblical
Obligations: A Preliminary Study in Comparative Hermeneutics, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 511
(1998); Steven D. Smith, Believing Like a Lawyer, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1041 (1999).
51. SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988).

52. Smith, supra note 50.
53. According to Professor Smith, for example, "[c]entral features of legal practice that
seem inexplicable from a rationalist perspective-and hence that rationalist theorists have
criticized throughout the past century-come to seem entirely natural and appropriate
from the standpoint of a certain kind of faith, or from what we might call 'legal faith.'" Id.
at 1113; see also Brian C. Murchison, Law, Belief and Bildung: The Education of Harry Edwards, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 127 (2000) (comparing Judge Harry Edwards's faith in the law
to the religious faith of Paul Scott's fictional character Barbie Batchelor).
54. See KRONMAN, supra note 20, at 3 (discussing the intrinsic value of practicing law).
55. Anthony T. Kronman, Living in the Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 835 (1987).
56. Id. at 836.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 838.
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vidual's professional life as a lawyer with the way that individual lives
his or her life. 59
Six years later, in The Lost Lawyer, Kronman's view of the centrality-or even primacy-of the lawyer's professional life developed an
explicitly theological component. Kronman repeatedly used religious
imagery to express his dissatisfaction with the state of the legal profession.6" For example, Kronman expressed admiration for the courtroom setting, in which "the well-being of the law is not only a subject
of explicit concern; it is a value superior to all others."' 6 ' He wrote,
however, of a profession struggling "against the forces of disorder that
threaten all our fragile human works."62 He lamented that we can no
longer look to the ideals of lawyering for an answer to "the question,
why is the life of a lawyer worth living., 63 Only someone who had such
a strong sense of faith in the legal profession as a religion would
mourn the realization that lawyers "have been forced to look for their
salvation outside the realm of work, after hours, in the intimacies of
private life."6 4
Kronman was not the first to suggest that the practice of law plays
a central role within the broader context of an individual's life, or
even to proceed with such a discussion by reference to religious be59. Notably, despite Kronman's optimistic conclusion that, "[a] life lived in the law...
has intrinsic worth for the person living it," id. at 874, the article also includes a haunting
prelude to the book that would follow six years later. Its closing lines state: "Will it be
possible, in the world of law that I fear is growing up around us, to answer someone who
asks why he should choose a living in the law or think of it as anything more than a way of
passing time and making money?" Id. at 876.
60. SeeShaffer, supra note 24, at 395 (discussing Kronman's use of religious rhetoric to
describe the commercialization of the legal profession).
61. KRONMAN, supra note 20, at 151.
62. Id. at 108.
63. Id. at 165.
64. Id. at 370. Professor Schiltz noted that The Lost Lawryer is
a prominent book about the "spiritual crisis" of American lawyers written by a
leading academic [which] barely mentions religion. Instead, the book asserts that
the "only" place that we . . . can meet our "need to believe that [our] lives are
worth living"-now that it is "unthinkable that one can find even the smallest part
of an answer [to the ultimate question of life's meaning] by choosing a legal
career"-is "in the realm of personal relations, of brotherly and erotic love, in the
sphere of private life."
Schiltz, supra note 5, at 753 n.181 (quoting KRONMAN, supra note 20, at 369-70) (citations
omitted). Professor Schiltz responds that "[t]his no doubt would come as a surprise to
many people of faith." Id.
Indeed, the notion that the practice of law can serve as a primary source of meaning
in life appears central to Kronman's abiding faith in the profession. See, e.g., Kronman,
Legal Professionalism,supra note 32, at 3 (stating that "[m]any people today look for meaning in their lives outside the world of work[,] [b]ut we professionals hang on to the idea
that we can find fulfillment in the work we do").
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liefs.6 5 Before Kronman, Professor Shaffer regularly looked to personal and religious values to help understand the individual's
relationship to legal practice.6 6 Professor Pearce has concluded that
Shaffer, and those who followed his example,6 7 have produced a "religious lawyering movement"6-a movement which recognized that a
person "might want to live in the office as he lives at home."69
Kronman's ideas differed, however, both in degree and kind,
with respect to the religious significance of the practice of law. From
Kronman's perspective, living the life of a lawyer did not merely reflect a noble or moral choice that could be reconciled or even integrated with other religious and personal values. Rather, he believed
that participating in the legal profession carries intrinsic value and
represents an independent and seemingly religious commitment to
the legal faith.7" As Professor Shaffer saw it, Kronman put "all his
65. Kronman traces the idea that "one's work" can be "intrinsically satisfying" to the
Judeo-Christian tradition and the story of "The Fall." Kronman, Legal Professionalism,supra
note 32, at 2-3. He suggests that the expulsion from Eden and attendant need to "work in
order to live" were originally perceived as "badge[s] of our spiritual condition as fallen
creatures." I&. Against this background, Kronman notes, it is understandable that work
was eventually viewed "as an arena for spiritual progress," and "redemption." Id. at 3.
66. E.g., THOMAS L. SArFER, ON BEING A CHRISTAN AND A LAWYER (1981); Thomas L.
Shaffer, The Practice of Law as Moral Discourse, 55 NoRE DAME L. REv. 231 (1979).
67. See, e.g., Russell G. Pearce, Foreword: The Religious Lawyering Movement: An Emerging
Force in LegalEthics and Professionalism, 66 FoRmAm L. REv. 1075 (1998) (tracing the course
of scholarship in this area).
68. Id. at 1075. For examples of the scholarship that has contributed to the emergence
of this movement, see Samuel J. Levine, IntroductoryNote: Responding to the Problems of Ethical
Schizophrenia, 38 CATH. LAW. 145 (1998); Symposium, Faith and the Law, 27 TEX. TECH L.
Rev. 911 (1996); Symposium, Lauyering and Personal Values, 38 CATH. LAw. 145 (1998);
Symposium, Rediscovering the Role of Religion in the Lives ofLawyers and Those They Represent, 26
FoRm-M URB. L.J. 821 (1999); Symposium, The Relevance of Religion to a Lawyer's Work: An
Interfaith Conference, 66 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1075 (1998).
69. Thomas L. Shaffer, On Living One Way in Town and Another Way at Home, 31 VAL. U.
L. REv. 879, 883 (1997). Professor Shaffer and others have acknowledged-and advocated-the possibility that the practice of law can serve as a virtuous endeavor when integrated into a broader ethical framework and lifestyle. See, e.g., id. at 889-92 (discussing how
feminist and religious ethical principles could help lawyers live a better lifestyle at work
and at home); Samuel J. Levine, The Broad Life of the Jewish Lawyer: Integrating Spirituality,
Scholarship and Profession, 27 TEX. TECH L. REv. 1199 (1996) (explaining how the author has
been able to integrate his work as a prosecutor with his spirituality as an Orthodox Jewish
individual).
70. See Kronman, Legal Professionalism,supra note 32, at 1-3 (discussing how the debate
over the meaning of legal professionalism implicates internal and external questions, and
explaining how viewing work as a way to gain spiritual value remains strong for some in the
legal community); Kronman, supra note 55, at 845-74 (arguing that the skill of good judgment, developed by practicing law, should give lawyers a basis for believing in the intrinsic
value of the work they do); cf Croft, supra note 19, at 1270 & n.76 (noting Kronman's
intrinsic-extrinsic distinction and finding that "[t]he intrinsic value of working within a
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hope" 71 in the role professional life played in "the life of a good lawyer," rather than recognizing the importance of "ethnic, religious, and
familial associations."7 2 Similarly, Professor Anthony Alfieri observed
that Kronman was "deeply wedded to the secular 'idea of a calling, of
salvation through work.' ,7 ' According to Professor Alfieri, Kronman
viewed work as "exert[ing] a 'transformative effect' on the human personality," and found that "[p]ersonal fulfillment... depends in substantial part on the 'meaning-giving power' of

.

.

. professional

work. 71
The deep pessimism prevalent in The Lost Lawyer represented an
expression of Kronman's loss of faith in the profession and the professionalism model, due in part to his acknowledgment of-and apparent surrender to-the increasing commercialization of the lawyer's
work. 7' Having had his faith shattered, Kronman found himself, like
the lawyers he observed, disillusioned and in need of affirmation of
his beliefs. 7 6 In The Lost Lawyer, Kronman was unsuccessful in his

profession derives from the occupation's inherent value as a worthy calling, rather than
from its status as a means to wealth, power, or prestige").
A number of scholars have argued that the substitution of the "religion" of professionalism for actual religion is misplaced. See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson, A New Class of Lawyers:
The Therapeutic as Rights Talk, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1062, 1071 (1996) (reviewing KRONMAN,
supra note 20). Professor Anderson criticizes the legal community's emphasis on professional ethics over personal ethics because "expansion of the professional ethical guidelines
assumes that their adherents have no life apart from the profession that would provide
another, broader basis for an ethical life." Id Professor Anderson adds, "[a] ttempts by
lawyers, lacking other sources of identity, to expand the empire of professionalism to cover
life at large because nothing else covers their own lives ought to give lawyers pause." Id. at
1072; see also Susan G. Kupfer, Authentic Legal Practices, 10 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 33, 44
(1996) (finding that "[t]here are dangers to this ideal professional self, not the least being
that a process of social construction tends to leave one interested more in conformity to
professional norms (by which success is measured) than in the pursuit of ideals generated
by other, more personal systems of belief"); Thomas L. Shaffer, Lawyer Professionalismas a
Moral Argument, 26 GONZ. L. REv. 393, 400, 405 (1990-91) (warning of "the tragic dimensions of turning professionalism into a moral argument," which include the argument "that
being in the profession will make you a better person").
71. Shaffer, supra note 24, at 395.
72. Id. at 396.
73. Anthony V. Alfieri, Denaturalizingthe Lawyer-Statesman, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1204, 122425 (1995) (reviewing and quoting KRONMAN, supra note 20, at 368-71).
74. Id.
75. See supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text (explaining the source of Kronman's
pessimism in The Lost Lawyer).
76. See Smith, supra note 50, at 1117 (criticizing Kronman for "adher[ing,] ... quite
aggressively.... to traditional legal methods that upon examination can be seen to reflect
...an orientation of faith, and indeed of 'legal faith'-that scholars and legal practitioners
are likely to disavow").
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search, "find[ing] nothing for us to follow."7 7 His conclusions
"lack[ed] hope . . .a necessary virtue for a believer. "78
Thus, following The Lost Lawyer, Kronman had to retreat from the
optimistic goals he pursued in his 1987 article and reassess some of
the fundamentals of his faith. With the realities he encountered in
The Lost Lawyer framing his perspective on the legal profession,
Kronman was required to rethink some of the most basic assumptions
about the professionalism model and the nature of the legal profession before he could consider any more attempts to explore further
79
the virtues of the life of a lawyer.
Kronman has found answers to these troubling issues. However,
he has cast his response not in empirical terms or even through impressionistic or experiential observations, but instead through expressions of faith in the legal profession replete with religious imagery,
demonstrating his apparent emergence from his religious crisis with a
new faith in the professionalism model.
Indeed, Kronman now articulates four articles of faith8" that form
the basis of his belief that "the practice of law" is "a profession ...that
entitle[s] those engaged in it to the special respect this word implies."8 1 According to Kronman, these characteristics of the legal profession contribute to its status as not merely a 'Job," like that of the
butcher, the brewer, or the baker,8 2 but-using a phrase that might
ordinarily be associated more closely with religion-a "way of life."8"
The first article of faith, which Kronman calls the "most famil" 4
iar,
and which appears to be the most important to him, is that "the
law is a public calling which entails a duty to serve the good of the

77. Shaffer, supra note 24, at 393.
78. Id. at 398 (footnote omitted).
79. See Alfieri, supra note 73, at 1225 (stating that "Kronman bemoans the 'dramatic
narrowing of the possibilities of salvation within the realm of work' sparked by the dissolution of traditional institutions and professional ideals").
80. The term "articles of faith" borrows from Professor Atkinson's observation that the
titles of works proposing a return to the professionalism model "imply, with perhaps a
more profound accuracy than their authors intended, that the documents they describe
are articles of faith." Atkinson, supra note 15, at 263.
81. Kronman, supra note 11, at 3.
82. In his work, Kronman repeatedly discusses work in terms of the butcher, the
brewer, and the baker as borrowed from Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations. See, e.g.,
Kronman, supra note 6, at 90-91. Kronman discusses Smith's contention that "the butcher,
the brewer, [and] the baker" contribute to "the public good" but "with an eye solely to
[their] own advantage." Kronman, supra note 11, at 3. Kronman argues that the lawyer is
different in that he or she "is charged with a conscious trusteeship of the public good that
cannot be discharged by any mechanism other than his own direct intervention." Id, at 4.
83. Kronman, supra note 11, at 2-3.
84. Kronman, Legal Professionalism, supra note 32, at 4.
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community as a whole, and not just one's own good or that of one's
clients."85 Kronman explains this concept largely in negative terms,
contrasting the lawyer with the baker and the brewer who "contribute
to the good of society not out of concern for the well being of society
itself, but solely through the pursuit of their own advantage, each
looking only to the profit
he hopes to make from the patronage of his
86
customers or clients."

The lawyer is different, according to Kronman, because "the
moral experience of law practice" is characterized by a "division of
allegiances"8 7 between "a particular client" and "the well being of the
law as a whole."8 8 Like many forms of religion, this duty to the public
good is all-encompassing, requiring lawyers to uphold this duty "not
just occasionally, notjust in the fraction of time [they] devote[ ] to pro
bono activities, but constantly and consistently,"8 9 "in every bit of advice they give and every litigation they conduct."9 ° In short, the lawyer's obligation to contribute to the public good attaches "in every
moment he is practicing law." 9 1 Kronman emphasizes that this obligation is solemnized "by the oaths [lawyers] swear upon admission to the
bar"-a procedure that echoes a religious ceremony.9 2
The second article of faith is the "nonspecialized nature of the
practice of law," which allows the legal profession to remain "a generalist's craft, whose possessor can move from one field to another."9"
Again relying on a contrast to another type of job, Kronman asserts
that unlike "activities like pin-making, which are characterized ...by
the division of labor into ever finer parts, each the province of a specialist with a tremendously developed but excruciatingly narrow expertise[,]

[1]awyers . . . perform a range of different tasks . . .

touching, in the process, on a dozen different areas of law," developing "a loose ensemble of methods and habits easily transported across
doctrinal lines."

94

Kronman acknowledges that this contrast does not necessarily
paint lawyers in the most favorable light. Specifically,
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Kronman,
Kronman,
Id at 5.
Id
Kronman,
Kronman,
Kronman,
Kronman,
Kronman,
Id.

supra note 11, at 3.
Legal Professionalism,supra note 32, at 4-5.

supra note 11, at 3.
Legal Professionalism,supra note 32, at 4.
supra note 11, at 3-4.
Legal Professionalism,supra note 32, at 4.
supra note 11, at 4.
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[f]rom the standpoint of the pin factory and all the other
modern forms of enterprise whose success depends upon the

division of labor and the cultivation of a deep but narrow
expertise, the fact that the law remains a generalist's craft
can only be interpreted as a sign of its dilettantism and amateurish backwardness.9"
Kronman does not explain why he rejects this perspective. Nevertheless, he counters that, "viewed in another light, with pride and not
embarrassment, the nontechnical nature of his work constitutes a second enduring source of the lawyer's claim to be a professional with a
freedom and range of activity that specialization destroys."9 6 Thus, as
a believer, Kronman emerges unscathed from the mocking criticism
of others, instead wearing such criticism as a badge of honor, without
responding directly to the substance of their attacks.
The third article of faith states that the legal profession "requires
more than intellectual skill."9 7 Again like many forms of religion, "[i] t
also requires the development of perceptual and emotional powers,
and hence necessarily engages parts of one's personality other than
the cognitive or thinking part. A good legal education is a process of
general maturation in which the seeing, thinking, and feeling parts of
the soul are reciprocally engaged."9 8 This principle, expressed in explicitly spiritual terms, powerfully articulates Kronman's belief in the
practice of law as a way of life.9 9
The fourth and final article of faith is the law's almost mystical
connection to the past.1 00 Kronman sees precedent as a "value" in the
law, because "[t]he law is internally connected to its past-connected
by its own defining norms and values-and not just externally connected, as every enterprise is, through the story an observer might tell
about its development over time."'0 ' Like accepting a religious tradition, " [t] o enter the legal profession is therefore to come into an activity with self-conscious historical depth, to feel that one is entering an
95. Id. at 5.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. As Kronman explains:
The process of training to become a lawyer, and the subsequent experience of
being one, gather the soul's powers in a way that confirms one's sense of wholeness as a person and sense of being wholly engaged by one's work in contrast to
all activities that can be mastered by the mind alone, which often produce, among
the technicians who perform them, a sense of partial engagement only.
Id,
100. Id. at 5-6; Kronman, Legal Professionalism, supra note 32, at 6.
101. Kronman, supra note 11, at 6.
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activity that has long been underway, and whose fulfillment requires a
collaboration among many generations." 0 2 Indeed, "[i]t is to know
that one belongs to a tradition."' '
Like many other forms of religion, Kronman's professionalism is
legitimized in part by its widely held traditions that connect it to the
past. 10 4 For example, in support of "the idea that work itself might be
intrinsically meaningful," Kronman harkens back to "the Judeo-Christian tradition" that views work "as an arena for spiritual progress, for
10 °5
fulfillment, and perhaps even for redemption.
Moreover, Kronman's professionalism looks to "ancient assumptions," accepted "both by lawyers and laypeople," that the practice of
law is a profession and that legal education is "a form of professional,
and not merely vocational, training."106 Indeed, Kronman asserts, the
idea that the practice of law is a profession lies "at the core of our
tradition [as] one idea that no one will dispute. 10° 7 According to
Kronman, then, belief in professionalism relies heavily on acceptance
of past assumptions, together with the repeated declaration that adherence to the faith is not disputed by others.
Thus, Kronman has become a powerful preacher to the believers,
exhorting law schools to take their rightful place as "heir to the traditions of the legal profession . . . [and] declar[e] [their] commitment

08
to sustain these traditions, whose survival is now in [their] hands."'
Responding to challenges to the professionalism model, Kronman
uses religious imagery, rallying the adherents of professionalism to

102. Id.
103. Id. (emphasis added).
104. Kronman has discussed elsewhere, on a broader level, the unique connection he
sees between law and tradition. See Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE
L.J. 1029, 1034 (1990) (stating that "[t]he law accords the past an authority that philosophy does not-an authority which indeed is incompatible with the independent spirit of all
philosophical reflection"). Cf Alfieri, supra note 73, at 1205 (critiquing Kronman's approach, which "accords tradition an authority that holds 'inherent and direct' sway over
the practice of law").
105. Kronman, Legal Professionalism,supra note 32, at 2-3. Kronman observes that "[t]he
notion that work has spiritual value is with us still, although the scaffolding of religious
ideas that accompanied its invention has largely fallen away. Today, the notion of meaningful work survives mainly in a secularized form." Id. at 3. For Kronman, this observation
may lend further support to his belief in professionalism, which can serve to fill the gap left
by what he sees as religion's loss of prominence in lending spiritual meaning to work. See
id.; cf. Cochran, supra note 14, at 306-07 (noting that "[t]he concept of professionalism
emerged from the religious orders of the Middle Ages," but that "[a]s the legal profession
evolved in England and the United States, it lost its religious character").
106. Kronman, supra note 11, at 3.
107. Id. at 2.
108. Id. at 1.
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fight against the infidels, urging them to engage in "battle" in the
"great struggle ... for the soul of the profession."' 0 9
Kronman's reaffirmed faith is seemingly unquestioning, not susceptible to the doubts in the professionalism model that he experienced with The Lost Lawyer. The language Kronman employs within
his declarations of faith in the legal profession reveals an approach
that does not seem to tolerate-or even acknowledge the existence
of-the claims of others. As Kronman exclaims, "[i] t is a cliche that
ours is a profession and not a trade. We all believe this. We all badly
want to believe it. It is an important thought for us to hold onto."' 110
No dissenting views are recognized; if they exist, they reflect the teachings of the heretics, those unfaithful to the religion of professionalism.1 1 The believers must cling to their faith, regardless of the
arguments and evidence offered by the heretics, arguments that just a
few years ago succeeded in leading Kronman astray.
III.

BUSINESS MODEL HERESIES AND THE REACTIONS OF
THE BELIEVERS

But of course there are heretics. There are those who do not
adhere to the religion of professionalism, and who have lost-and
have not regained-any faith they may have once had in the intrinsic
virtue of living the life of a lawyer. The heretics take various forms,
attacking the professionalism model with different arguments. Perhaps the argument most dangerous to the continued success of the
religion of professionalism is that which nearly claimed one of its most
coveted proponents: the argument that law is not a profession but a
business.' 12
Many scholars assert that the practice of law now resembles more
a business than a profession, observing that "lawyers aggressively seek
out new clients" by advertising "in the various public media," and placing greater emphasis on public relations.1 15 The modern practice of
law is a business in which "rainmakers are viewed as valued firm assets," and "[t]he financial pressures to obtain and keep clients are so
great that lawyers' ethics codes are, in fact, geared toward restraining
109. Id. at 12.
110. Kronman, Legal Professionalism, supra note 32, at 1 (emphasis added).
111. See, e.g., Atkinson, supra note 15, at 266 (stating that one danger of advocating for
one true professional faith "is that those who object to the present professionalism crusade
will be denounced as heretics, enemies of a shared professional faith").
112. E.g., Pearce, supra note 6, at 1230.
113. Robert T. Begg, The Lawyer's License to DiscriminateRevoked: How a Dentist Put Teeth in
New York's Anti-DiscriminationDisciplinary Rule, 64 ALB. L. REv. 153, 169-70 (2000).
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'

14
One scholar has characterized
"the modus operandi" of law practice as "the relentless, cynical pursuit
of clients and profits." '
Professor Schiltz has attacked a number of beliefs that the professionalism model espouses, specifically as manifested in large law
firms.' 1 6 Though he does not expressly refer to the professionalism or
business model, Schiltz observes that lawyers "complain about the
commercialization of the legal profession-about the fact that practic'
ing law has become less of a profession and more of a business, 17
and he emphasizes the central role that money takes in legal practice. t" 8 Employing characteristically blunt terms, Schiltz declares that

excessive solicitation of clients.

[the legal profession] is absolutely obsessed with money....
Money is at the root of virtually everything that lawyers don't
like about their profession: the long hours, the commercialization, the tremendous pressure to attract and retain clients,
the fiercely competitive marketplace, the lack of collegiality
and loyalty among partners, the poor public image of the
profession, and even the lack of civility.1 19
114. Id. at 170.
115. Tanina Rostain, Ethics Lost: Limitations of CurrentApproaches to Lawyer Regulation, 71
S. CAL. L. REV. 1273, 1328 (1998). It is interesting that the concern, expressed by many of
these scholars, over the increasingly commercial nature of legal practice, appears to be
somewhat of a global phenomenon, and is certainly not unique to the United States. One
scholar describing the phenomenon in Nigeria uses language that could just as easily be
used to describe the views of many scholars regarding American lawyers. See Okechukwu
Oko, ConsolidatingDemocracy on a Troubled Continent: A Challenge for Lawyers in Africa, 33
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 573, 640 (2000) ("The notion of materialism celebrated by Nigerian lawyers has resulted in a decline in professionalism and has engendered public contempt for the legal profession ....
The public will never support or appreciate a legal
profession that is more interested in making money than serving the public." (footnote
omitted)).
116. Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REv. 871 (1999).
117. Id. at 888.
118. Id. at 895-906, 912-15.
119. Id. at 903; see also AT THE BREAKING POINT, 1991 A.B.A. NAT'L CONF. REP.

("[M]oney is not just incidental to the practice, but at its core."); REPORT AND

12

RECOMMEN-

DATIONS OF THE QUALITY OF LIFE TASK FORCE, 1991 N.C. B. Ass'N SEC. REP. 9 ("[T]he mis-

guided view of money as the sole goal of practice, sole measure of success and sole measure
of self-worth is directly and indirectly responsible for many of the problems in practice
today . .

").

Professor Schiltz's article prompted a symposium issue of the Vanderbilt Law Review,
which included a number of responses by leading scholars and practitioners, including
Marc S. Galanter & Thomas M. Palay, Kathleen E. Hull, Michael J. Kelly, Howard Lesnick,
Mary A. McLaughlin, Stephen L. Pepper, and Michael Traynor. See Symposium, Attorney
Well-Being in Large Firms: Choices Facing Young Lawyers, 52 VAND. L. REv. 869 (1999). Schiltz,
in turn, offered a rejoinder to these responses. PatrickJ. Schiltz, Provoking Introspection: A
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Professor Pearce, a leading heretic to the belief in the professionalism model, has "chronicled the decline of professionalism" by documenting "the loss of faith in the distinction between a business and a
profession."' 20 Pearce's critique of the professionalism model is effective-and, to believers, threatening-because it relies on empirical evidence to contradict one of the central articles of faith in
professionalism: the belief that a lawyer's primary concern is to serve
12 1
the good of the community and not the pursuit of profit.
Professor Pearce cites many examples of trends in legal practice
that belie the belief that lawyers maintain a more noble approach to
their jobs than those whose primary goal is their own business interests. 1 22 Specifically, he notes the "common perception among legal
commentators... that lawyers are primarily motivated by self-interest
and the desire to make money." 1 23 The very nature of practicing law
encourages such a culture. For example, "[i] n large law firms, the
profits a lawyer generate Is] by procuring business or producing billable hours, and not professional excellence, determine [s] that lawyer's
rewards. Fewer lawyers appear[ I] to engage in public service, and
those who d[o] f[i]nd that it br[ings] them little favor at their
firms. 1

24

Pearce cites a number of scholars and studies to support the

observation that "[s]ome lawyers t[ake] advantage of this atmosphere
to 'generat[e] the highest possible fee,' rather than provide the best
possible service." 125 According to Pearce, "[t] his pursuit of fees ...
[is] the catalyst for law firms to take on the forms of businesses." 12 6 In
adopting a business approach, firms "add [ ] managers, business plans,
marketing directors, and financially driven strategies to maximize efficiency in making profits." 127 In short, based on the evidence he has
collected and presented, Pearce considers the continued belief in the
Reply to Galanter& Palay, Hull, Kelly, Lesnick, McLaughlin, Pepper, and Traynor, 52 VAND. L.
REv. 1033 (1999).
120. Pearce, supra note 6, at 1230.
121. See id. at 1263-76 (concluding that a business paradigm will replace the professionalism paradigm and that the business paradigm is good for the legal community).
122. See id. at 1249-50 (discussing increasing competition among lawyers through advertising); 1251-56 (noting that law practice is a larger industry than the steel or textile industries, and discussing the impact of increased marketing on law practice); 1257-62
(discussing the increased commercialism of the practice of law).
123. Id. at 1251 (quoting Elizabeth A. Kovachevich & Geri L. Waksler, The Legal Profession: Edging Closer to Death with Each PassingHour, 20 STETSON L. REv. 419, 423 (1991))
(alteration in original).
124. Id. at 1251-52 (footnotes omitted).
125. Id. at 1252 (alteration in original).
126. Id.
127. Id.
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professionalism paradigm to be outdated, an "anachronism" that "is
1
almost impossible to sustain."

28

Though Pearce is far from alone in his heresy against the belief in
the professionalism model, 129 it appears that believers-as defenders
of the faith-are particularly troubled by his observations and arguments, deeming his views so dangerous that they warrant a public
response.130
Two of the most powerful responses were published in a symposium in the Florida State University Law Review.13 ' The responses are
sharply critical of Pearce's thesis that the business model is a more
accurate and more useful framework for understanding the work of
lawyers than is the professionalism model.132 Both responses, however, appear to reflect the unwillingness or inability of believers in
professionalism to consider the possibility that their faith is misguided. While the heretics attack the professionalism model with empirical evidence, defenders of that model respond largely with
preaching and exhortations to remain faithful.
In his published keynote address to the symposium, Kronman reiterates the articles of his faith, articulating his belief that lawyers are
interested in the public good rather than their own profit. 3 3 Responding implicitly to Pearce's heretical arguments, Kronman states,
"I don't mean to suggest-what of course is not true-that lawyers are
exclusively concerned with the public good."' 34 Nevertheless,
Kronman remains unwilling to impute to lawyers a commercial mo128. Id. at 1264. Pearce borrows the term "anachronism" from a United States Supreme
Court opinion. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 371-72 (1977) (stating that "the
belief that lawyers are somehow 'above' trade has become an anachronism"). Pearce cites
Bates as "confirming that the perspective of law as a business ha[s] moved from the margin
to the center of the legal community's discourse." Pearce, supra note 6, at 1250.
129. See supra notes 112-119 and accompanying text (discussing various criticisms of the
professionalism model).
130. It is worth noting that two of the leading heretics to the "religion" of professionalism, Pearce and Schiltz, are themselves leading proponents of the importance of actual
religion in the life of a lawyer. Pearce is widely recognized as one of the current leaders of
the "religious lawyering movement," see supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text (discussing this "movement"), having organized major symposia at Fordham Law School addressing the relationship between religion and the practice of law. The Relevance of Religion to a
Lawyer's Work, supra note 68. Schiltz is now Associate Dean at the University of St. Thomas
School of Law, a school he helped establish with the express goal of encouraging law students to incorporate ethics, as well as religious and personal values, into their professional
goals and perspectives. See http://www.stthomas.edu/lawschool/mad/mad.htm.
131. Symposium, Defining and Refining Professionalism:Assessing the Roles and Regulation of
Lawyers in the Twenty-First Century, 27 FIA. ST. U. L. REv. 1 (1999).
132. See Kronman, Legal Professionalism, supra note 32; Stempel, supra note 4.
133. Kronman, Legal Professionalism, supra note 32, at 4-7.
134. Id. at 5.
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tive. Instead, he speaks of a "division of allegiances" resulting from
the fact that "[e]very lawyer is at one and at the same time the representative of a particular interest, a particular client, a particular claim,
and also an officer of the court, concerned for the well being of the
law as a whole."1 5 When Kronman does refer to the relationship between the practice of law and the market, it is in the sense that
"[t]hrough their public-spirited devotion to the integrity of the legal
system that enframes the market-based and market-driven world in
which we live, lawyers make a crucial contribution to the good of society as a whole." t36
Only at the end of the speech does Kronman address Pearce's
arguments more directly, acknowledging that "[o] ur profession is now
being remade in the image of the market system, a system that itself
needs the integrating professionalism of lawyers."13' 7 In fact, he warns
that "the legal profession is .

.

. becom[ing] just a business like any

38

other."
His response, though, is to express an unqualified reaffirmation of his faith, and a call to others to work against the potential
dangers that may result from heretical ideas such as those Pearce espouses. 139 Though he does not refer to Professor Pearce by name,
Kronman concludes the address by insisting on how "urgently we appreciate the value of the very qualities this 'paradigm shift' seeks to
expunge" and calling on all believers to join him in "resolv[ing] to
hold on to these qualities as long and as best we can."140
The most extensive-and most pointed-defense against
Pearce's heretical teachings was put forth by Professor Stempel, who
organized the symposium.'
Like Kronman, Stempel employs lan135. Id.
136. Id. at 6.
137. Id. at 7.
138. Id.
139. See id
140. Id
141. See Stempel, supra note 4. It is perhaps telling that Professor Stempel concedes that
his focus on Pearce's approach entails "some risk of oversimplification and overpersonalization." Id. at 33. Reactions by the faithful to the apparently dangerous teachings of a
heretic may often be characterized by a simplistic depiction of the heretical argument,
combined with a "blame the messenger" mentality that substitutes an attack on the heretic
for a more nuanced and substantive response.
Indeed, Pearce may have anticipated such a reaction from the establishment of believers in professional faith. Pearce cites the example of Karl Llewellyn to illustrate the "function of normal discourse . . . to marginalize perspectives outside of the Professionalism
Paradigm." Pearce, supra note 6, at 1245. Referring to Llewellyn as "one of the leading,
though sometimes iconoclastic, voices of twentieth-century legal scholarship," Pearce suggests that "[a]s an iconoclast, Llewellyn brought to his analysis of the profession . . . an
outsider perspective open to new ideas challenging the Business-Profession dichotomy."
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guage of faith in his criticism of the business model, writing that
Pearce has "forsaken the basic core of the professionalism paradigm,"' 4 2 and that "a business-based construct of lawyering holds inherent evils."' 4 3
Moreover, despite the attacks of the nonbelievers, Stempel's
methodological framework is premised on a strong presumption that
favors faith in the professionalism model. He posits that "the burden
of persuasion rests with [Pearce] and other advocates of the business
paradigm."' 44 Stempel acknowledges that "[t]o an extent,... by placing the burden of persuasion for change on Pearce I am being a bit
unfair," in part because, he admits, "it would ...be hard [for Pearce]
to convince me and other defenders of the professionalism paradigm"
of the validity of his approach.1 4 5 Despite these concessions, Stempel
abides by the presumption.
Likewise, Stempel's reaction to Pearce's criticism of the rationale
behind professionalism seems to suggest that Stempel's conclusions
are based more in an unswerving faith in the professionalism model
than in an intellectually honest inquiry. 146 Again, Stempel offers a
concession, noting that "there may have been some flaws in previous
formulations of the rationale."1'4 7 According to Stempel, however, it is
possible that only "our dominant explanations for why law must be
viewed as a profession [are] flawed."' 4 8 Thus, he argues, "[p]reviously
persuasive rationales for a professionalism paradigm may be outdated,
but the system of professionalism remains well justified by more modem policy goals. 149 Stempel draws a parallel to "a precept or doctrine [that] may emerge based on one rationale but may maintain its
value under a different rationale after the original justification becomes outdated."' 5 0 The reference to a "precept" or "doctrine" that
transcends time in remaining dominant despite apparent flaws seems
to evoke a received religious tenet taken on faith rather than a reaId. at 1245-46. Perhaps foreseeing the response of believers to his own ideas as much as
describing those to Llewellyn's, Pearce concludes that "[i]n normal discourse, outsider
perspectives have little influence." Id. at 1246.
142. Stempel, supra note 4, at 33.
143. Id. at 34.
144. Id. at 41.
145. Id. at 42 n.66.
146. See id. (admitting that "much of [his own] belief is premised on intuition and personal experience rather than systematic study and measurement").
147. Id. at 37.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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soned conclusion derived through an analysis of current
circumstances.
Perhaps the most revealing aspect of Stempel's response to
Pearce is his reliance on the assertion that "there is no doubt that the
professionalism paradigm enjoys the status of a dominant paradigm." 15 1 Specifically, he notes that

[a]lthough there are many like Pearce who have criticized
the professionalism regime and have argued for more practice of law as a business, there is not even a separate school of
law-as-business thought to which these lawyers can retire to
study the new gospel. There is not even a law school espousing the law-as-business paradigm that prospective students
can attend. If students want to join the community, they
must attend a conventional law school which is structured
152
around the traditional paradigm of lawyer identity.
In short, Stempel finds it "obvious [that] Pearce's or other scholars'
disagreement with this state of affairs does not displace the
paradigm."' 5 3
Thus, simply by invoking his own membership in the dominant
faith, Stempel rejects any empirical basis for Pearce's heretical ideas.
Rather than offering a response to Pearce's empirical evidence, such
reliance on the hegemony of the believers in the professionalism
model appears to deny-or at least ignore-reality in favor of perpetuating the faith of those in power. Indeed, Kronman's position as a
leader of the faith only reinforces an impression of members of the
legal establishment, so extensively documented by Stempel, who are
unwilling to consider the possibility that a heretic among them has
demonstrated that their faith is not the only true faith and, in fact,
may well be unfounded.
CONCLUSION

In 1995, in advocating a recognition that a business model was
replacing the professionalism model for the practice of law, Professor
Pearce anticipated the negative reaction his heretical ideas would receive from the establishment of believers in professionalism. 154 Indeed, he carefully chose the concept of a "paradigm" as a framework
through which to express his views, noting how difficult it would be
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 54.
Id, at 54-55.
Id. at 56.
See supra note 141.
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155
for either the believers or the heretics to persuade the other side.
Implicitly acknowledging the nearly religious divide between the believers and the heretics, Pearce explained that "[w]hether the new
paradigm succeeds in a revolution depends more on the power of
conversion than logical argument. No 'logical' choice is available between competing paradigms that 'disagree about what is a problem
1 56
and what a solution.' ,,
In the same year, Professor Atkinson constructed a more explicit
comparison to religious argument, referring to a professionalism "crusade" and to himself as a dissenter.' 57 Relying on this analogy, Atkinson insisted that, "[a]s in matters of religion, so in matters of
professional aspiration, we are unlikely to come to full agreement,
and we are almost certainly not going to be able to bring other conscientious people to our belief by force of either argument or arms. "1158
Six years later, the professionalism crusade continues, with believers in the professionalism model confident in their reaffirmed faith
and strong in their defense against the heretical ideas they encounter.
With such luminaries as Anthony Kronman leading the crusade, it appears that the legal establishment may successfully quell the dissent
within its ranks and maintain the professionalism model as the one
true faith. Regrettably, however, such success, premised not on persuasion and reason but on the exercise of hegemonic power, while
perhaps satisfactory to the believers, may ultimately prove illusory.' 59

155. Pearce, supra note 6, at 1232-33, 1236.
156. Id. at 1236 (footnote omitted) (quoting THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUrIONS 109 (2d ed. 1970)).

157. See Atkinson, supra note 15, at 261-70.
158. Id. at 269.
159. See Pearce, supra note 6, at 1231 (arguing that "the Professionalism Paradigm is
socially constructed. Its authority rests not on its truth in any abstract sense, but in its
acceptance by the relevant community.").

